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NOTE
TELESCOPES, BINOCULARS, AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Since the Supreme Court's landmark fourth amendment' decision
in Katz v. United States,2 courts have considered a wide variety of cases 3
involving alleged violations of defendants' "reasonable expectation of
privacy."14 In particular, courts have experienced difficulty in evaluat-
ing evidence acquired by police through the use of telescopes and binoc-
ulars.5 This Note critically reviews the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard as applied to evidence obtained through telescope and
binocular surveillance, and suggests that police use of telescopes and
1 The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2 389 U.S. 347 (1967). FBI agents in Katz attached an electronic listening and record-
ing device to the outside of a public telephone booth from which the defendant made incrimi-
nating telephone calls. The Court held that this action constituted a search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, determining that the eavesdropping activities
"violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth." Id. at 353; see notes 15-24 and accompanying text in fa.
3 The exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence secured by the police through
an unreasonable search or seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Searches and seizures are reasonable when authorized by a war-
rant issued by a judge or magistrate upon "probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To meet the probable cause requirement for the issuance of search
warrants, the police must show probable cause that the items sought are connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. 1 W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEizuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 442 (1978). Before con-
ducting a search or seizure, the government must obtain a warrant issued and based on an
"informed and deliberate determination" of probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
110-11 (1964); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). The issuance of a search
warrant by a judge or magistrate upon determination of probable cause defines the point at
which the governmental interest in law enforcement overrides individual interests in privacy.
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and therefore prohibited by the fourth
amendment, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(dictum) (fourth amendment permits warrantless searches incident to an arrest if confined to
area within suspect's immediate control); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (fourth amend-
ment does not ban warrantless limited search ofperson whom officer reasonably believes to be
armed and dangerous); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Court allows evidence seized
without a warrant by police in "hot pursuit" of fleeing suspect).
4 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see notes 25-
27 and accompanying text infia.
5 See 1 W. LAFAvE, szupra note 3, at 256-62; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation
of Pr'vahy Test, 76 MICH. L. Rav. 154, 179-80 (1977); note 37 infra.
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binoculars to observe activities or objects unobservable from a proper
location by the "naked eye" violates an individual's expectation of
privacy.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY STANDARD
The Supreme Court's 1886 landmark decision in Boyd v. United
States6 triggered the ultimate development of the reasonable expectation
of privacy standard. Rather than adopt a literal reading of the words
"search and seizure," the Court emphasized the function and spirit of
the fourth amendment 7 and stressed the need to construe liberally con-
stitutional provisions protecting the security of persons and property.8
In so construing the fourth amendment, the Court noted that the
amendment
appl[ies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its em-
ploy~s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his inde-
feasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private prop-
erty .... 9
The Court's decision in Olrsteadv. United States, ° however, signaled
a retreat from the expansive doctrine set forth in Boyd. In Olmstead, a
closely divided Court held that wiretapping is not a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment." The majority justified its conclu-
6 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Court ruled unconstitutional a statute that permit-
ted the government to order the accused to produce invoices of goods alleged to be fraudu-
lently imported.
7 The Court noted that although the compulsory production of invoices "is divested of
many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, . . . it contains their sub-
stance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose." Id. at 635.
8 The Court stated: "A close and literal construction deprives [the constitutional provi-
sions] of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance." Id. Noting the interrelationship between the fourth and
fifth amendments, the Court stated that "the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned
in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to
give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amend-
ment ... " Id. at 633; see Note, Fomalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privay
Under the Fourth and FJfth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945, 956 (1977) ("That these two
amendments should independently protect a person's books and papers was [for the Boyd
Court] all the more reason to place the individual's private communications in a special posi-
tion beyond the government's reach.").
9 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
10 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11 Id. at 464. The Court upheld the defendant's conviction of "conspiracy to violate the
National Prohibition Act by unlawfully possessing, transporting. . . importing, . . . [and]
selling intoxicating liquors." Id. at 435. Police obtained evidence of the conspiracy by inter-
cepting the conspirators' telephone conversations. Without trespassing on the defendants'
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sion on the ground that the police had intercepted the defendants' tele-
phone conversations without entering their premises.' 2 Justice Brandeis,
dissenting, maintained that the majority erred in restricting the fourth
amendment to physical trespasses on constitutionally protected areas.' 3
With an eye to the future, Justice Brandeis recognized that technologi-
cal development might one day enable the government to invade a citi-
zen's privacy without setting foot on his property or placing a hand
upon his person. 14
property, the officers inserted small wires along the telephone wires leading from defendants'
residences and from the basement of a large office building where defendants worked. Id. at
456-57.
12 Id. at 464-65. Moreover, the Court implied, a telephone conversation is not an "ef-
fect" protected by the fourth amendment:
in the Boyd case, [the Court] said that. . . the Fourth Amendment [was] to be
liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in
the interest of liberty. But that can not justify enlargement of the language
employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers,
and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or
sight.
Id. at 465.
13 Id. at 474-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14 The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espio-
nage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be devel-
oped by which the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed be-
liefs, thoughts and emotions.
Id. at 474.
After Omnstead, the Court initially circumvented the trespass doctrine by applying Sec-
tion 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976), to government
wiretapping of personal communications. In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937),
the Court interpreted the Act to exclude in federal criminal trials evidence obtained by fed-
eral agents tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages. Fifteen years later, however,
the Court held that wiretapped evidence could be admitted in state courts if obtained by state
agents. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). In 1957, the Court extended the Act to
exclude illegal state-gathered wiretap evidence in federal courts. Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96 (1957). Finally, in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), the Court overruled
Schwartz, holding that the Act prohibited the admission of state-gathered wiretap evidence in
state as well as federal courts. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was amended
in 1968. As amended, the section incorporates 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2517 (1976), which permit
wiretapping and the admission of evidence obtained through wiretapping under limited cir-
cumstances.
In 1942, the Supreme Court extended the 0/nutcad trespass doctrine to permit the use of
devices that, when placed against a wall, detect sounds on the other side of the wall. In
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), federal agents installed a listening apparatus
in the defendant's office. Id. at 131. The listening apparatus was not functioning properly, so
the agents attached a detectaphone to the wall of a room adjoining defendant's office. Id.
Through the use of this detectaphone, the agents overheard the incriminating conversations
later admitted into evidence. The Court held the evidence admissible because the trespass
committed in installing the listening device "did not aid materially in the use of the detecta-
phone." Id. at 135.
Relying on the Onstead trespass doctrine, in 1961 the Court did exclude a defendant's
conversation on fourth amendment grounds. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), federal agents overheard incriminating conversations by means of a "spike mike" that
1982]
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Nearly forty years later, in Katz v. United States, 15 the Court repudi-
ated the Oinstead trespass doctrine. In Katz, the defendant's conviction
was based in part on evidence from phone calls he had made from a
public telephone booth to which FBI agents had attached microphones
without a warrant.1 6 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the elec-
tronic surveillance did not violate the fourth amendment because the
microphones had not penetrated the wall of the telephone booth. 17
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless eaves-
dropping violated the fourth amendment.18 The Court discarded the
notion that fourth amendment privacy interests must be bound to prop-
erty rights. 19 Establishing that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places," 20 and stressing the defendant's privacy interests rather than
the location of the microphone,21 the Court formulated the general rule
they pushed through the wall of an adjoining row house so that the mike touched upon a
heating duct in the defendant's house. Id. at 506. The mike's connection with the duct con-
stituted "an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area"; the Court announced
that "[w]e find no occasion to re-examine aldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by
even a fraction of an inch." id. at 512. Justice Douglas, however, urged in concurrence that
the Court abandon its trespass distinctions founded on rigid adherence to property concepts
and principles:
The depth of the penetration of the electronic device---even the degree of its
remoteness from the inside of the house-is not the measure of the injury
. . . . Our concern should not be with the trivialities of the local law of tres-
pass, as the opinion of the Court indicates. But neither should the command
of the Fourth Amendment be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind
of electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be with
whether the privacy of the home was invaded.
Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring).
15 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Seegeneral4y Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 1968 SuP. Or. REv. 133; Note, Katz andthe Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Erpecta-
tion of ,vacy or, A Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 C LEV. ST. L. REV. 63 (1974); Note, The Reasonable
Expectation ofJriva,-Katz v. United States, A Postscri:ptum, 9 IND. L. REv. 468 (1976); Note,
supra note 5; Note, From Pn'vate Places to Personal Aivag: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968 (1968).
16 389 U.S. at 348. The District Court for the Southern District of California convicted
defendant Katz under an eight-count indictment that charged him with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084 (1976). Section 1084 proscribes the transmission of betting or wagering information
by wire communication. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966), reo'd,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17 Katz, 369 F.2d. at 133-34. The majority expressly relied upon Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
18 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
19 Id. at 353. The Court noted that "[t]he premise that property interests control the
right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited." Id. (quoting Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). The Court concluded that the trespass doctrine formu-
lated in 0/imstead and Gold/nan, see note 14 supra, "can no longer be regarded as controlling."
389 U.S. at 353.
20 389 U.S. at 351.
21 Id. at 353. The Court stated:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device
[Vol. 67:379
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that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.1 22 On the basis of this rea-
soning, the Court concluded that Katz had "justifiably relied" on the
privacy of his conversations 23 and thus was entitled to protection from
unconstitutional electronic surveillance.24
In his widely quoted concurring opinion,25 Justice Harlan enunci-
ated a two-part test to determine the privacy interests that the fourth
amendment protects: 26 (1) "a person [must] have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy"; and (2) this "expectation [must] be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 27 Thus, the
Katz Court soundly rejected the proposition that fourth amendment
protection against warrantless searches and seizures extends only to
physical trespass into constitutionally protected areas. 28 Rather, the
amendment restricts warrantless government activity that invades an in-
dividual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." 29 A person will seldom
voluntarily expose incriminating activity or objects to the public;3 0 thus,
a defendant ordinarily will be able to demonstrate that he possessed a
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance.
Id.
22 Id. at 351-52 (footnotes omitted).
23 Id. at 353; see note 21 supra.
24 389 U.S. at 359.
25 Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26 The Court has impliedly adopted Justice Harlan's test. SYee Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 556 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Amsterdam, Perspecties on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1971); Note, Tracking Katz- Beepers, Pdoa,, and the
Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE LJ. 1461, 1472 n.66 (1977).
27 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 353. Nevertheless, courts cannot entirely disregard the property considerations
that underlie the Olnstead decision. These considerations affect the evaluation of both the
defendant's subjective expectation of privacy and the reasonableness of that expectation. As
Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion in Katz:
The question, however, is what protection [the fourth amendment] affords to
...people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference
to a "place". . . .Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy .... On the other hand, conversations in the open would
not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 353; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556 (1979); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 384.
30 In addition, the fourth amendment does not distinguish between an individual's pri-
vacy from the government and his privacy from the public. Indeed, if a person exposes his
actions to other private citizens, such actions cease to be private, and the fourth amendment
no longer protects them from government observation. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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subjective expectation of privacy.3 1 The more difficult question for
courts is the reasonableness of the defendant's subjective expectation.
This question usually can be resolved by determining whether the de-
fendant should have foreseen that his activity or objects could be seen,3 2
heard,33 or even smelled3 4 by a reasonably curious member of the public
at large.35 If so, then the defendant's expectation is unreasonable, and
police observation or detection would not violate the fourth
amendment.3 6
II
POST-KATZ DECISIONS
A. Telescope and Binocular Surveillance Cases
Since Katz, many federal and state courts have considered whether
the use without a warrant of binoculars or telescopes to view private
activity and objects violates the fourth amendment.3 7 Although the
31 This would fulfill the first requirement of the Katz two-part test. See note 27 and
accompanying text supra.
32 Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,590 (1974) (One has a diminished expectation of
privacy in an automobile because "[i]t travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants
and its contents are in plain view.").
33 Cf. United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1032 (1969) (no reasonable expectation of privacy as to conversations carried on in tone of
voice audible to person standing outside their home).
34 Cf. United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (action of narcotics
agent in "sniffing" strong odor of marijuana coming from suitcase did not violate reasonable
expectation of privacy because defendant should have expected that railway employees or
fellow passengers would handle luggage).
35 One commentator characterizes the "reasonably curious person" as follows:
first, an individual with normal motives for inquiring into others' affairs. He
(or she) is neither a voyeur nor a member of a class with unusually strong
incentives for investigation (such as business competitors or newspaper report-
ers). Second, a reasonably curious person seeks to satisfy his curiosity by em-
ploying means of discovery that other members of the public with similar
motives would be likely, as an empirical matter, to use. Such an individual
neither resorts to illegal methods nor uses means that, although legal, are un-
common. Finally, the reasonably curious person may be purposeful in his
investigation, but only to the extent that normal curiosity impels.
Note, supra note 26, at 1482.
36 Of course, the fourth amendment may in some situations allow police observation of
private activity even though the defendant would not anticipate that his activity could be
seen, heard, or smelled by a reasonably curious member of the public-for example, where a
defendant burglarizes a summer cabin during the off-season. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143-44 n.12 (1978). See also Kitch, supra note 15, at 136 ("It is not the nature of the
search, however, [that determines whether or not it is constitutionally protected] but the rela-
tionship between the area and the person incriminated by the search. .. .
37 See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (agents used telescope
to observe defendant preparing cocaine in his apartment); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d
37 (4th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (police used binoculars to observe defend-
ant unloading illegal liquor from truck outside his warehouse); United States v. Grimes, 426
F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970) (police used binoculars to observe defendant loading illegal liquor
into truck parked in front of his home); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.),
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Supreme Court has never squarely addressed this issue, dicta in two
cases preceding Katz suggest that binocular and telescope surveillance is
not a search within the meaning'of the fourth amendment. 38 These de-
cisions, however, applied the Olnstead trespass doctrine 9 to alleged
fourth amendment violations and thus are inapplicable to a post-Katz
analysis.4°
Lower federal courts and state courts in cases decided since Katz
have examined this issue in a variety of ways. Some courts have ignored
Katz. In United States v. Grimes,41 for example, the defendant contended
that the police violated his fourth amendment rights by the warrantless
use of binoculars to observe him placing boxes of illegal liquor into a
vehicle parked in front of his home.42 The Fifth Circuit, without men-
tioning atz, held that the police did not violate the fourth amendment
because the special investigator made the observations from a neighbor's
field, not from the defendant's property.43 In State v. Thompson,44 the
Nebraska Supreme Court also apparently ignored Katz in upholding po-
lice use of binoculars to observe, through a ground floor alley window,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (agents used binoculars to observe defendants operating ille-
gal still in shed); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (FBI agents used
telescope to observe illegal gambling in apartment); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153
Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979) (police used binoculars to observe illegal pornographic materials in
eighth floor office); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 380 N.E.2d 669 (1978) (police
used binoculars to observe heroin exchange on public street); State v. Thompson, 196 Neb.
55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976) (police used binoculars to observe defendant using drugs through
ground floor window); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) (FBI agent used binoculars to observe printing of "Las Vegas"
football gambling forms in defendants' printshop); State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 530 P.2d
306, cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (detective using both the naked eye and binoculars ob-
served defendant's marijuana plants).
38 United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) ("Such use of a searchlight is compara-
ble to the use of a marine glass or a field glass [and it] is not prohibited by the constitution.");
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) ('The use of bifocals, field glasses or the
telescope to magnify the object of a witness' vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if
they focus without his knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private
indiscretions.').
39 &e notes 10-14 and accompanying text sufira.
40 In Lee, the Court held that the Coast Guard's use of a searchlight to observe the
defendant's boat was lawful because the officers did not physically enter the boat. 274 U.S. at
563. In On Lee, the use of a transmitter and receiver to hear a federal agent's discussion with
the defendant on the defendant's premises was not an illegal search and seizure because the
agent committed no trespass when he entered the defendant's premises. 343 U.S. at 751-54.
41 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
42 Id. at 708. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for possessing and
illegally transporting distilled spirits in containers lacking the appropriate tax stamps. Id. at
707. The defendant was convicted on the basis of evidence discovered through the warrant-
less use of binoculars by the police.
43 Id. at 708. The Fifth Circuit cited Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), in
which the Supreme Court held that an open field is not a constitutionally protected area. Id.
at 59.
44 196 Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976).
1982] 385
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the defendant using drugs. 45 The court noted that "[t]he officers had a
right to be in the alley and there was nothing unlawful in their use of
binoculars. '46
A second group of courts,47 although citing Katz, have failed to ex-
amine adequately the defendant's expectation of privacy at the time of
surveillance. These courts focus on the property issue of where the po-
lice were located when conducting the surveillance, rather than focusing
on Katz's broader expectation of privacy standard. Although these
courts cite Katz,48 their reliance on antiquated notions of property rights
ignores Kate's lesson that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."'49
Finally, several courts have conducted extensive analyses of the rea-
45 Id. at 56-57, 241 N.W.2d at 512-13. The court found that observation of a marijuana
party in progress gave police reasonable cause to enter the defendant's house, arrest him, and
seize the drugs as evidence. Id. at 57, 241 N.W.2d at 513.
46 Id. One dissenting judge, however, found that Katz applied to make the police activ-
ity an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 57-58 (Grant, J., dissenting).
47 In United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 936 (1974), police used binoculars to view the defendant unloading illegal liquor from a
truck located outside the defendant's warehouse. Id. at 38. The Fourth Circuit, citing Katz,
noted that in view of the time of day and all the surrounding circumstances, defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The court also observed that the police observation
did not take place within the "curtilage" of the defendant's property. The court concluded
that the police observation did not violate the fourth amendment and affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction for possession, transportation, and removal of illicit liquor. Id. at 38.
In Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968),
the police, from a distant point on a farm owned by one of the defendants, used binoculars to
view the defendants operating a still inside a shed. 392 F.2d at 433. The Tenth Circuit cited
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), see note 43 and accompanying text siupra, to
support its conclusion that because the police made the observations while located outside the
curtilage, there was no fourth amendment violation. 392 F.2d at 434-35. The court briefly
acknowledged that, in light of Katr, a situation might arise in which surveillance from outside
the curtilage would constitute an illegal search, but that this was not such a case. Id. at 435.
48 Minton, 488 F.2d at 38; Fullbnght, 392 F.2d at 435.
49 389 U.S. at 351. Several state courts have also engaged in cursory analyses of this
problem. In Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 380 N.E.2d 669 (1978), the police used
binoculars to observe a heroin exchange on a public street. Id. at 350, 380 N.E.2d at 671.
Although the court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy during
the period of the surveillance, id. at 352, 380 N.E.2d at 672, it never expressly explained why
the defendant could not have maintained such an expectation on a public street. In State v.
Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 530 P.2d 306, cer. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975), policemen used
binoculars to observe from a public sidewalk marijuana plants in the window of the defend-
ant's second floor apartment. Id. at 121, 530 P.2d at 307. The officers observed the plants
from a distance of 40 to 50 feet. Id. Although the officers first saw the plants without the aid
of binoculars, they used the binoculars to confirm their eariler observations. Id. at 124, 530
P.2d at 309. The court, in holding that the binocular surveillance did not violate the fourth
amendment, concluded that the failure to curtain a window negates any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from visual observation. Id. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.
Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971), an FBI agent climbed a
four foot ladder to observe the illegal printing of gambling sheets in the defendant's print
shop. Id. at 178, 263 A.2d at 905. The agent had used binoculars to look into the shop's side
window, which was 30 to 35 feet away. Id. at 179, 263 A.2d at 905. In rejecting the defend-
ant's fourth amendment arguments, the court reasoned that the defendant could have cur-
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sonable expectation of privacy test in the context of binocular and tele-
scope surveillance. In People v. Amo, 50 the police used binoculars to
observe illegal pornographic materials on the eighth ,floor of an office
building.51 The California Supreme Court, relying on Katz,52 over-
turned a convictiofi:
So long as that which is viewed or.heard is perceptible to the naked
eye or unaided ear, the person seen or heard has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in what occurs. Because he has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, governmental authority may use technological aids
to visual or aural enhancement of whatever type available. However,
the reasonable expectation of privacy extends to that which cannot be
seen by the naked eye or heard by the unaided ear.53
The court concluded that because the police would not have been able
to view the materials without the use of visual aids, the evidence was
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.54
In United States v. Kim,55 FBI agents located one quarter of a mile
from the defendant's building used a telescope to view illegal gambling
activities in the defendant's high-rise apartment.56 The court noted that
sophisticated visual aids used for government surveillance can intrude
on a person's privacy to the same extent as the electronic surveillance in
Kaa.57 The court determined that an unaided "plain view of defend-
ant's apartment was impossible, [and that] only an aided view could
penetrate." 58 Therefore, the court excluded the evidence that the agents
would have been unable to obtain without the aid of a telescope. 59
tamined the window and thereby manifested an expectation of privacy. Id. at 181-82, 263 A.2d
at 907.
50 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979).
51 Id. at 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 626. The magistrate issued a warrant on the basis of
these observations. Execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of pornographic films and
various business documents. Id. at 510, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 626. This evidence led to the de-
fendants' conviction for possession with intent to distribute obscene films. Id. at 508, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 625.
52 Id. at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 627. The court stated: "We thus view the test of validity
of the surveillance as turning upon whether that which is perceived or heard is that which is
conducted with a reasonable expectation of privacy and not upon the means used to view it
or hear it." Id.
53 Id. at 511-12, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
54 Id. at 512, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
55 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976).
56 Id. at 1254. The FBI used observations made through this telescopic surveillance to
establish probable cause for approval of a wiretap on defendant's phone. Id.
57 Id. at 1255-56.
58 Id. at 1256.
59 Id. The court noted, however, that binocular surveillance of the defendant's activities
on the balcony of the apartment probably did not violate his reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. Id. at 1257. Nevertheless, the court excluded all the evidence, including that relating to
the balcony activity, refusing to "split hairs" to determine which evidence was obtained solely
from the surveillance of the balcony. Id. at 1257-58.
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In United States v. Taborda,6° the police, stationed in an apartment
across the street from the defendant's apartment, used a telescope to
observe the defendant preparing cocaine, apparently for a street sale.6 1
The Second Circuit concluded that
observation of objects and activities inside a person's home by
unenhanced vision from a location where the observer may properly
be does not impair a legitimate expectation of privacy. However, any
enhanced viewing of the interior of a horrie does impair a legitimate
expectation of privacy and encounters the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement .... 62
The court, therefore, remanded the case to determine whether the ad-
missible evidence obtained without the use of a telescope provided suffi-
cient probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. 63
B. Analogous Applications of the Katz Standard
Courts have applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test in
situations analogous to telescopic and binocular surveillance. In United
States v. Fisch,64 police officers, located in an adjacent motel room, over-
heard incriminating conversations between the defendants.65 The
Ninth Circuit, holding evidence pertaining to the conversations admissi-
ble, emphasized that the police had not overheard the defendants
through electronic means; rather, the conversations were audible by the
"naked ear."' 66 The defendants, the court noted, could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to conversations easily overheard
by persons in adjoining rooms. 6 7
60 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
61 Id. at 133-34. The agents used the information they had obtained through telescopic
as well as naked eye surveillance to establish probable cause for a search warrant authorizing
a search of defendant's apartment. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search of defendant's apartment. 491 F. Supp. 50,
53 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
62 635 F.2d at 139.
63 Id. at 141.
64 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
65 Id. at 1074. The evidence obtained through this eavesdropping led to the arrest and
conviction of defendants on charges of importing, possessing, and intending to distribute ma-
rijuana. Id. at 1073.
66 Id. at 1076. The court noted that "[t]he officers were exercising their investigative
duties in a place where they had a right to be and they were relying upon their naked ears."
Id.
67 The court, emphasizing the second prong of the Katz two-prong test, see note 27 and
accompanying text supra, mentioned certain factors that courts should consider in determin-
ing whether a defendant's expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable."' 474 F.2d at 1077 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). These factors include "the non-trespassory origin of the information
received, the absence of artificial means of probing,. . . the gravity of the offense involved,
• . . [and the] type of information received. .. ." 474 F.2d at 1078. The court concluded
that in this case, "the expectations of the defendants as to their privacy, even were such
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Under this view, persons should not be deemed to have a reason-
able expectation of privacy as to activities and objects that others can
see without the use of visual aids.8 On this basis, the government's war-
rantless use of an electronic tracking device is not an illegal search under
the fourth amendment. 69 The rationale for such holdings is that this
device merely facilitates what police could accomplish with the naked
eye.70 Similarly, fourth amendment protection should not extend to
binocular or telescope observations that could otherwise be made with
the naked eye.71
Courts have employed similar reasoning to uphold police use of il-
lumination devices that expose objects and activities concealed by the
dark.72 Because a flashlight merely enables police to view the same ob-
expectations to be considered reasonable despite their audible disclosures, must be
subordinated to the public interest in law enforcement." Id.
Other courts have also held that defendants have no expectation of privacy as to motel
room conversations heard by the unaided ears of police officers lawfully occupying adjoining
rooms. E.g., United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 329-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (individual who
speaks in "normal" tones but is still overheard by the naked ear has no reasonable .expectation
of privacy); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-53 (5th Cir. 1979)
("[C]onversations in a motel room which are audible to one in an adjoining room constitute
words exposed to the 'plain view' of others.'); cf. United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816-18
(8th Cir. 1977) (defendants had no expectation of privacy with respect to conversation in
hallway of their apartment building); United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 883-84 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032 (1969) (individual who speaks in tone audible to person
outside his door has no reasonable expectation of privacy).
68 See Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971) (no fourth amendment violation where
police looked in unobstructed motel room window from common hallway and observed nar-
cotics possession).
69 See United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-35 (9th Cir. 1976) (installation of elec-
tronic tracking device did not violate defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy); United
States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J., concurring) ("The intrusion on
defendant's privacy was no greater [through use of a beeper] than an intrusion created by
manual, visual surveillance of the car's location, which is clearly permissible irrespective of
fourth amendment considerations.').
70 See United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34-35 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he device only
augments that which can be done by visual surveillance alone."); cf. Christie, Government Sur-
veillance and Individual Freedom: A Proposed Statuto Response to Laird v. Tatum and the Broader
Probem of veanment Surveillance of the Individual, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 871, 885 n.68 (1972)
("When 'surveillance' involves the observation of the public activities of an individual. . . it
is hard to pin down any fourth amendment rights that have been violated.').
Some courts, however, hold that the warrantless use of "beepers," even though merely
facilitating what police could accomplish with the naked eye, does constitute a fourth amend-
ment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-67 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part
on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Tracking Katz Beepers, AJevay,
and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977).
71 The reasoning of the electronic tracking device cases, see notes 69-70 supra, implies
that if these devices enable the government to gather evidence that is beyond the perception
of the naked eye, the government activity constitutes a search under the fourth amendment.
Analogously, the fourth amendment should extend to observations made possible only by
visual enhancement devices, such as binoculars or telescopes.
72 E.g., United States v. Lara, 517 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1975) (use of searchlight to
view contents of vehicle does not preclude application of plain view doctrine to such observa-
tion); United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917
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jects that they could have seen in daylight, courts find such searches
consistent with the fourth amendment. 73 The use of binoculars or
telescopes, however, may enable police to view objects and activities not
otherwise observable. Thus, the use of binoculars and telescopes more
closely resembles government use of magnetometers and x-ray ma-
chines,74 which courts have held to be searches under the fourth
amendment.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions support the position that the
fourth amendment extends to the warrantless use of visual aids to view
activities not readily observable by the naked eye. In United States v.
Millr,75 the Court held that a government subpoena of bank records is
not a search under the fourth amendment because a depositor has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial information that he
conveys to a bank.76 In Smith v. Maqland,77 the Court held that because
a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone
number he dials, police installation of a pen register78 to record the
numbers dialed is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.79 In both cases, the Court emphasized that a person has no ex-
pectation of privacy as to information he voluntarily conveys to others.80
(1975) ("The fact that the contents of the vehicle may not have been visible without the use of
artificial illumination does not preclude such observation from application of the 'plain view'
doctrine.'); United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hood, 493
F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1972); Walker v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1971);
Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); People v. Waits, 196 Colo. 35, 580
P.2d 391 (1978); Redd v. State, 242 Ga. 876, 243 S.E.2d 16 (1978); People v. Whalen, 390
Mich. 672, 213 N.W.2d 116 (1973).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972) ("since it would
not constitute a search for the officer to observe objects in plain view in the automobile in
daylight, it ought not to constitute a search for him to flash a light in the dar as he was
walking past it in the night'); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)
("When. . . the police officer's observation would not have constituted a search had it oc-
curred in daylight, then the fact that *the officer used a flashlight to pierce the nighttime
darkness does not transform his observation into a search.'); People v. Whalen, 390 Mich.
672, 679, 213 N.W.2d 116, 120 (1973).
74 Courts have held that it is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment to
use an x-ray machine or radiographic scanner to project electronic emanations through an
object and reveal, in picture form, the shape of objects within the container examined. See
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974). See also People v. Fritschler, 81
Misc. 2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
75 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
76 Id. at 441-43. The defendant had moved to suppress microfilms of his checks, deposit
slips, and other records that the bank maintained.
77 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
78 A pen register is a "device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by moni-
toring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released." 442 U.S. at
736 n.1. See geteraly Note, The Legal Constraints upon the Use of the Pen Register at a Law Enforce-
ment Tool, 60 CoRN.L L. REv. 1028 (1975).
79 442 U.S. at 742-46.
80 In Miller, the Court determined that the defendant had "voluntarily conveyed" the
financial information to the bank's employees. 425 U.S. at 442. In Smith, the defendant had
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Those who engage in private activity that others can see with the naked
eye may "voluntarily" be exposing such activities to others. Activities
visible only through the use of telescopes or binoculars, however, are not
voluntarily exposed to anyone-people do not ordinarily anticipate that
other citizens carry telescopes and binoculars to observe other's
activities.
III
ANALYSIS OF TELESCOPE AND BINOCULAR SURVEILLANCE
A. Comparison of Telescope and Binocular Surveillance to Electronic
Wiretapping
Government use of electronic devices to hear and record telephone
conversations constitutes a search under the fourth amendment;81 conse-
quently, such searches are unconstitutional if undertaken without a war-
rant.82 Police use of telescopes and binoculars to observe private activity
not otherwise visible is potentially more intrusive than the use of elec-
tronic aids to monitor telephone conversations.
First, telephone conversations are occasionally interrupted by oper-
ators or by the crossing of lines, and by definition involve more than one
person. Thus an individual's expectation of privacy as to the contents of
a discussion may be diminished, knowing that others can always pass on
its contents to third persons.83 Finally, police interception of telephone
conversations can be more easily limited8 4 than can visual surveillance
of private activity. If the conversation is obviously not of a criminal
"voluntarily conveyed" the information to the telephone company and its employees. 442
U.S. at 744. The Smith Court cited Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966), in which
the overhearing of the defendant's incriminating discussions by the defendant's friend, who,
unbeknownst to the defendant, was a government informer, was found not to be a search and
seizure. Cf. United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000
(1971) (no expectation of privacy as to calls made from mobile telephone units in automobiles
because anyone tuned to same frequency might overhear calls); United States v. Choate, 576
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978) (looking at mail covers not fourth amendment search because per-
sons voluntarily expose this information to postal employees).
81 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
51 (1967).
82 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357.
83 The Supreme Court's decision in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) implies
that there is such a diminished expectation of privacy. The Court held that the government's
placement of the defendant's friend to listen to incriminating discussions between the defend-
ant and his associates was not an illegal search and seizure under the fourth amendment. 385
U.S. at 300-03. The Court stated that the fourth amendment does not protect "a wrongdoers
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal
it." Id. at' 302. The Court reaffirmed Ho/ in the post-Katz decision of United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
84 Certain techniques are required to reduce the interception of communications that
are not authorized for interception. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); 18
U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
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nature, the police must end the interception. 85 Visual surveillance, how-
ever, often requires constant observation of private activity.86
B. A Standardfor Analyzing Telescope and Binocular Surveillance
Under Katz, courts must examine the defendant's expectation of
privacy in determining the admissibility of evidence obtained through
the use of telescopes or binoculars.8 7 Although one might expect a rea-
sonably curious person to witness activity visible to the naked eye, one
does not expect him to observe activity from a distant location with a
telescope or binoculars. Hence, warrantless government use of
telescopes or binoculars to view activity or objects not otherwise observ-
able from a proper location8 8 violates the subject's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, and thus contravenes the fourth amendment.
Incriminating evidence obtained in this manner therefore must be
suppressed.89
Thus, courts should consider carefully the facts of cases in which
85 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518(5) (1976).
86 See Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big
Brother?, 3 HASTNGS CoNST. L.Q. 261, 287 (1976).
87 See notes 28-35 and accompanying text sura.
88 Courts have addressed the issue of proper location by determining whether the police
had a legal right to be in the place where they perceived the private activity. See, e.g., United
States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1343 (4th Cir. 1981) (police did not violate fourth amend-
ment by using step ladder to peer inside window of airplane parked on runway of public
airport because they made observation from position rightfully occupied); United States v.
Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 1980) (no violation when police overheard conversations
in adjacent motel room because they had legal right to be there); United States v. Orozco,
590 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1979) (police did not violate fourth amendment when they looked
through windows of car parked on public street because they made observation from right-
fully occupied position); Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1973) (no violation
when police looked through windows of car parked in public lot because observation made
from rightfully occupied position). The critical factor in making this determination is
whether the police "intruded onto private property." United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357,
369 (3d Cir. 1981). Of course, the absence of a trespass will not automatically validate the
search. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("the reach of [the Fourth] Amend-
ment cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure").
89 For example, if the police use binoculars to observe the defendant's activity on a
public street, where any passerby could easily view the activity, then the defendant generally
cannot assert a violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy. On the other hand, a de-
fendant in a tenth floor apartment, not observable from the street or a neighboring building
with the naked eye, would possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. This standard differs
from the plain view doctrine discussed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
The Coolidge Court stated:
An example of the applicability of the "plain view" doctrine is the situation in
which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects,
and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating
character. . . . Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain
view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legiti-
mate. . . . What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a priorjushftiation for an intrusion in the course of
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the government has obtained incriminating evidence through the use of
telescopes and binoculars. If the government could not have acquired
the evidence without the use of a visual aid,90 the court should require a
warrant. One factor relevant to this determination is whether the area
was such that a person properly situated could have observed the activi-
ties or objects with the naked eye.91 In addition, the distance from
which the observation took place may indicate whether the police could
have seen the activity or objects without a telescope or binoculars.92 Fi-
nally, the location of the activity or objects, although not controlling, 93
may be helpful in determining the admissibility of such evidence.94 For
example, activity taking place in a commercial establishment is often
readily observable by customers or employees,95 whereas activity in a
person's home ordinarily would be seen only by its inhabitants.
C. A Closer Look at the Reasonable Expectation of Privag Standard
Because the use of telescopes and binoculars is not widespread in
our society, citizens maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy for
activity and objects not readily observable by the naked eye. This anal-
ysis, however, suggests that a substantial increase in the use of telescopes
and binoculars to monitor private activity could conceivably render un-
reasonable this expectation of privacy.96 Moreover, the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy standard is susceptible to another, more troubling
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused.
Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added). The Coolidge Court identified two requirements for police
seizure of items that are not legitimate objectives of the search: (1) there must be a prior valid
intrusion and (2) the discovery of the undescribed evidence must be inadvertent. Id. at 468-
71. See also Moylan, The Plain View Docrine Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geog-
raphy Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047, 1073-78, 1081-88 (1975).
90 The government may want to use telescopes or binoculars to observe activity or ob-
jects visible from a closer location without visual aids to avoid the greater risk of discovery.
91 For example, activity undertaken by a person near an uncurtained window of a
ranch-style home would probably be visible to a person standing on a sidewalk in front of the
home. Cf. State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976) (court approved police
use of binoculars from alley behind defendant's home to observe criminal activity through
ground floor window); notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
92 Hence, private activity observed from a distance of only 100 feet might be observable
without a visual aid, whereas activity observed from a distance of 1,000 feet probably would
be unobservable without some technological aid. Cf. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131,
135 (2d Cir. 1980) (police, stationed in adjacent building, viewed activity in defendant's
apartment from distance of 190 feet); notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra; cf. United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (police viewed defendant with telescope
from distance of one quarter mile). See also notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
93 See notes 15-35 and accompanying text supra.
94 See note 28 supra.
95 See note 49 supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904
(1970), cen'. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) (police used binoculars to view activity in defendant's
print shop).
96 Moreover, the use of more sophisticated and highly technological devices might in-
crease to such a level that citizens, subject to surveillance of unprecedented degree, could not
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influence. The government has the means to manipulate the privacy
expectations of its citizens and may choose to exercise these means. For
example, the government could eliminate reasonable expectations of
privacy "merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was
being advanced ... and that we were all forthwith being placed under
comprehensive electronic surveillance. '97 Justice Harlan, the author of
the reasonable expectation of privacy test,98 has since expressed serious
doubts about the test's soundness:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective
expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expecta-
tions, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.99
As Justice Harlan observes, courts can best avoid improper fourth
amendment analysis by injecting policy considerations into their analy-
sis. They should seriously evaluate whether a particular investigative
technique, although not infringing upon a particular individual's expec-
tation of privacy, is one that our society is willing to tolerate. Courts
should weigh the affront to society of the investigative technique against
the cost to law enforcement. If the threat to "the aims of a free and
open society"' 00 outweighs the benefits of the technique, fourth amend-
ment protection must be afforded. On the other hand, if a highly effec-
tive investigative technique poses only a slight threat, the fourth
amendment would not be implicated.401
This analysis suggests that the government's warrantless use of vis-
ual aids to observe objects and activities not perceptible with the naked
eye contravenes the fourth amendment. Indeed, if the government's use
of these devices was unrestrained, the practical implications for private
citizens would be unsettling. Patrolling policemen, equipped with high
powered telescopes or binoculars, could scan the interiors of houses and
apartments in search of wrongdoing.10 2
A prohibition against warrantless use of telescopes and binoculars
reasonably expect privacy in even the most intimate of settings. See gmfraly Note, supra note
86, at 266-69.
97 Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 384.
98 Se notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
99 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 403.
101 Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("This
question must. . . be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely
extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the
conduct as a technique of law enforcement.").
102 The lack of restrictions on police use of telescopes and binoculars does not merely
threaten those engaged in criminal activity. If the police are permitted to obtain evidence by
using telescopes and binoculars to view activities not observable by the naked eye without
first establishing probable cause, surveillance with visual aids of all activity-both criminal
and noncriminal--could become prevalent.
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to view activities and objects not observable by the naked eye would not
significantly impair effective law enforcement. Police may continue to
use visual aids to enhance observation of objects and activities visible
with the unaided eye. Moreover, the police are always free to use
telescopes and binoculars to view private activity if they first secure a
warrant by showing probable cause. 103 It is the existence of probable
cause that signals the point at which the government's interest in law
enforcement outweighs the threats posed to society by the use of
telescopes and binoculars to observe private activity.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States requires that
courts determine whether government activity has violated a defend-
ant's reasonable expectation of privacy. The use of telescopes or binocu-
lars to observe activity or objects that a person could not have viewed
from a lawful location without the use of these aids violates reasonable
expectations of privacy; evidence so obtained must be excluded. The
development of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard since
Katz, and a comparison of telescope and binocular surveillance to elec-
tronic wiretapping, supports this conclusion. Because the government
can manipulate expectations of privacy, courts should weigh the threat
to a free and open society posed by visual enhancement devices, against
the utility of the techniques to law enforcement. The limited impair-
ment to law enforcement of a requirement that police first obtain war-
rants before using telescopes and binoculars to view private activity
unobservable by the naked eye is a small price to pay for the significant
privacy interests that such a requirement would promote.
Lawrence Kaiser Marks
103 & note 3 supra.
